After the presentation, each group member will comment and reflect on any ideas raised, or neglected, in the question, keyword, response and discussion process during the preceding week. And, if so inclined, the discussion leaders may revisit and comment on previous questions, keywords, responses, discussions and commentaries. A goal of the synthesis is to help develop a coherent narrative about the issues raised throughout the course. Thus, a possible outcome of your postings would be that at the semester's end one could, simply by reading all of the syntheses, get a clear sense of the relationship among significant ideas raised in the class.
With respect to Not for profit, why Democracy Needs the Humanities class discussion focused on the status of the book as an effective manifesto. Disagreement existed as to whether her prescribed program of pedagogy built on critical thinking and on the Socratic method were potential key elements in producing engaged citizenry in a democracy or if these are but a few methods in addition to other sites of democratic practice such as service learning, social clubs, political clubs, non-profit work, activism, etc. Disagreement also existed in class discussion whether fostering critical thinking was the sole goal of Nussbaum's text or whether she also anticipated these methods producing a person that would come to conclusions which she advocates, such as educational institutions not focused on profits. One point was made regarding the integrity of the mission of small liberal arts colleges, many of which are renewing or inventing a commitment to the education of the "whole person." These institutions stand in contrast to research universities focused on attracting research or other money.
The class did not address directly whether Nussbaum had a particular audience in mind for the text or whether she had a particular political agenda. Her focus on compassion as a necessary emotional strength in a democracy led me to reflect on whether other strengths are just as important, such as leadership, confidence, self-reflection, etc. She argues that compassion is the necessary companion to positional thinking. I had wondered if this were not a particularly “feminine” trait, and whether she were advocating to a particular group to develop more compassion. Is there an actual dearth of compassion in our society or is it that those that exhibit compassion lack other traits that would bring their modes of thinking or leadership to the fore?
The class also discussed bringing critical inquiry into pedagogical practice and questioned whether Nussbaum's prescription for education is possible under a capitalist system. The class came to its own place for potential synthesis or incorporation of Nussbaum's proposals: if we were to incorporate the educational pedagogies she advocates, where should we start (not assuming that the Humanities by default practices as Nussbaum preaches)? The answers ranged from with the self to undergraduates to graduate students to professors to outside the system entirely.
Though the class dismissed the notion that the title Not for profit, why Democracy Needs the Humanities needed to correlate to the content and was potentially employed just because it is catchy, I am left dissatisfied in that I truly would like to see a defense for the humanities that doesn't necessarily hook it onto something else, some other bigger, better idea. Her focus on pedagogy in Chapters 1 - 4 did not defend or reason the existence of the liberal arts, but of why a particular kind of pedagogy is more effective for achieving democracy (and I am not necessarily convinced of that).
(Crystal Allene Cook)
Towards the end of the discussion we entered more interesting territory. Specifically in how an individual perceives of and achieves an education. One thought-provoking question was whether an education is inherently authoritarian? For instance, does the Socratic method fish for questions or does it encourage a realization of reality? At this moment, I’m more inclined to say that education is authoritarian because there is intention behind it—I even think it is authoritarian to encourage an individual to learn on their own. But is that necessarily a bad thing? The authoritarianism is itself a reality and creates something worthy of critiquing and pondering.
When asked how we would apply a different model of education, I noticed that there were difficulties providing a clear outcome of education (if we even assume that an outcome is desirable). It feels almost personally conflicting to try and determine the education of another person. I think instead of looking at education only in the university, we should ask how individuals use their spare time. What learning occurs off campuses, and should it be ascribed with any particular value in relation to other forms of knowledge? Whose responsibility is it to educate—the teacher, the student, or both? Returning to the original point: our main problem with implementing a model is having no (or very different) definitions of what an education should be or whether education should even be a goal.
One question I had is about the book itself and the author’s intentions. If you have a book about democracy and call it Not for Profit, then why not share the content of the book over the internet instead of having people have to pay for the book.
Just as a sketch of the whole discussion, I think there were important points about process. I felt afterwards that I raised questions of doubtful relevance (specifically in asking whether the presentation of the book by someone with a science background would change our perception of the facts). Perhaps it is better to avoid these what-if scenarios and focus on the more tangible (and difficult) question of what can we do now? I value the importance of thinking outside the book.
(Dave Duckett)
David Harvey’s brief history (and critique) of neoliberalism gives us a basis for understanding how market logic has taken hold of the university and how the humanities seems interested in mimicking this market logic in order to stay afloat. Talk of “skills” and “excellence” translates to dollar signs. To this sort of public relations rhetoric, we raise normative questions of what the humanities, (or economists or scientists or anyone, for that matter) ought to do. Under neoliberalism, the answer is simple: produce and earn, letting the market determine the distribution of wealth at the expense of labor and class power. In this way, neoliberalism fails to meet the ideals of its theory with the reality of its practice. Under neoliberalism, humanities attempts to commodify, but even as we acknowledge this, our inquiry is informed by the neoliberal state to which we answer. Artists, writers, and thinkers of all sorts flock to the cultural hubs of New York City and London, the same cores of neoliberal power. This consolidation of power for the humanities may be detrimental as it severely limits broader public engagement with the arts and critical thought and thereby access to avenues for a compassionate worldview (Nussbaum). Further, while neoliberalism trickles down regardless of whether people understand it, the humanities do not. Therein lies the importance of the humanities in education. The humanities serve as a site for contestation, critical analysis, and understanding of matters regarding economic, political, social, and cultural trends, thus creating more thoughtful, informed, and empathetic citizens. What such citizens can do to resolve problems with the neoliberal state as it currently functions has yet to be seen.
What can be seen is that in order for humanities to function as a social movement of sorts, it should reject (or at least try to work out from under) the constraints set upon it by neoliberalism. Humanities take time to do, or to do properly. Time is a commodity. They require small, safe spaces in which one can engage in critical thought closely with others. This is not cost effective. Increasingly, with budgetary issues and administrators answering to the “higher power” of the market, education goals are quantified and students are assessed, and they are taught information rather than ways of thinking about issues. Abolishing grades would help rectify this, but the notion is in direct conflict with the goals of the neoliberal university that decides who makes the cut, who can produce, who is impactful, who is valuable. To be a vehicle for social change, the humanities must collectivize and challenge conventions of the past and present, but the neoliberal agenda seems to render this impossible.
(Alex McCarthy)
Our discussion of Harvey’s A Brief History of Neoliberalism allowed us to more thoroughly investigate similarities in the practice of the humanities and the practice of neoliberalism and the (consistently similar) underlying philosophies of each. For example, we talked about the impact of geographical centers on the perpetuation of class stratification—in the case of neoliberalism, finance and cultural “freedom” are centered in New York City, which assists the direction of wealth to the wealthy; in the case of art, publishing and cultural “freedom” are centered in New York City, which exacerbates the disconnect between art and (rural/Midwestern/southern) citizen.
This concomitance led us to consider the theory of the humanities—as distinct from its practice, following Harvey’s explication of this dichotomy in the case of neoliberalism—its deep principles and their potential for resistance against the neoliberalism they would presumably have us resist. We seemed to accept the proposal that the humanities is a “site of contestation,” a safe space for debate. In even this simplest of theoretical formulations, the humanities has wavered in practice: 1) the artificial time constraints placed on learning (50 minutes three times per week for sixteen weeks, for instance) along with increasing requirements regarding measurable productivity—skills-based assessment, etc.—serve the interest of a corporatized academy rather than contestation, which may be temporally amorphous and unquantifiable. As we have before, we arrived at the simplest aporia we face in reconciling current university practices and the nature of work in the humanities—grades belong to the former, we to the latter. Even if this may be compartmentalized to the classroom, our research and/or art is not less, but more bound to the market logic of the neoliberal university; two denominations of academic currency, the CV and its constituent the book, advance the privileging of the individual that pervades neoliberalism at the expense of the very collectivism that 1) may fair better against the dominant logic (as evidenced by social movements of the past) and 2) may better reflect the theoretical fiber of the humanities.
Finally, we echoed Martha Nussbaum by identifying as the first mover in the ethics of humanistic inquiry and learning the principle of empathy. In addition to the commitment to contestation, we can add to our list of practical practices in humanities classrooms within the dominance of neoliberalism both service learning (which is, happily, marketable by and so attractive to the university, but no less genuinely and even intimately appropriate for the fields of the arts and humanities) and reading and writing about the often unseen and/or misunderstood effects of neoliberalism on real human beings.
(Uren)
Any discussion of ethics, of any kind, is always fraught with certain uncertainties; discussing ethics as the pertain to humanist and social science research is just one massive grey area, which we all muck around in and wade through. IRBs seek to regulate some of this, but their standards and methods are unsatisfactory (to say the least) to the “softer” sciences and liberal arts. The concept of personal responsibility on the researcher’s part was tossed around a lot and I still believe this to be a key factor in any kind of research, as is the knowledge that one cannot predict everything that might go wrong. In medical research this could be devastating – but how does this pertain to interviews? To surveys? To observational research? The concept of "effective responsibility" drifted around in discussion even if it was only directly addressed a handful of times - it didn't need to be. It seemed that we could all agree on the fact that consenting adults should be treated as just that.
There is obviously a growing frustration among social scientists and humanists with the current constraints put on them when wanting to conduct research with “human subjects” (which, for our purposes, remains unsatisfying and broadly defined). The number of hoops we need to jump through just to get IRB approval is enough to dissuade trying in the first place. Not only that, but there is concern, brought up by Schrag and other social scientists, that participants may feel obligated to participate beyond their level of comfort if they have to sign waivers and other kind of paper work before the "research" can begin. While we can all agree that perhaps some kind of regulation is necessary, we have yet to find any satisfactory solution for our purposes. It seems that some of us balk at the idea of being “regulated” at all, with fears that such regulation could easily go too far as its power extends farther and farther from its original realm of influence – which ties in nicely with Schrag’s suggested imperialist (colonizing?) behavior of review boards. The thought of neoliberal ideals achieved through and with research regulation is a little frightening, but very real.
(Kate Natishan)
The emphasis on personal responsibility stems from our discussion about IRBs and the constraints through the governance of research in the social sciences and humanities. Personal responsibility is one way to begin to question the IRB system. Personal responsibility as a framework for resolving the problems raised by the question of ethical research allows researchers to formulate a way forward. To take back some of the responsibility that has been outsourced on the par t of researchers to the IRB resounded with many in our discussions. The initial debates surrounding IRB formation did not include participants from non medical or physiological fields, thereby forcing us to consider how the IRB might function in an imperial manner. Clearly, Schrage leaves the questions up to us as researchers to ponder, but makes the implicit argument that a specific medical ethics have been institutionalized at the IRB to govern the research of the non medical practitioners.
The questions raised in class about the intersection between ethics, the IRB and Neoliberalism were left a bit inconclusive. Certainly the IRB allows for the quantification of research and accountancy of research on a far greater and more centralized scale, but how does neoliberal market practices and theories intersect with research governance along ethical lines? Do we need to govern social and humanities research along ethical lines or could we imagine another form of governance that is not based on ethics? Clearly, there was broad consensus in our discussions that research should be governed, but we were left a bit empty on how this might occur in a “middle way.” How can we govern research while at the same time not narrowing or curbing valuable research by predicting prior to its completion that it might cause harm? The idea that seemed to resound in class in both Tuesday and Thursday’s discussions was that there has to be a balance between laissez faire research governance and regulation. One of the ways was to insure participation in the creation of governance, but participation does not necessarily alleviate the problems of control.
We are left at the end of the day searching for a way to seek this middle way, but have not formulated concrete answers or paradigm. Critical to seeking a middle way is the nature of inquiry itself. What do we consider inquiry? What do we consider knowledge? These are simple yet incredibly important questions that must inform any discussion of governance. Inherent in any imagination of defining knowledge and inquiry is the imposition of a system of values to define our conceptions. We must be distinctly aware that any attempt to construct a system of values brings to the table a possibility of imperialism. One way, as I have briefly mentioned in the key words discussion of “ethics” and “imperialism,” is to be mindful of the effects governance has on pluralism. We are caught in the age old debate between how to protect the minority during majority rule. Schrage helps us to consider that medical ethics won at the end of the day in the formation of the IRB and alerts us to the exclusion of competing fields. We have a starting point in engaging the IRB, but we must propose a method and way forward that adjudicates the questions mentioned above in order to prevent another Tuskegee, but also to minimize harm to research that pushes the boundaries of our knowledge in however form we define knowledge.
(Gregory)
Though consensus was not reached in class regarding how Popper would address the change from a totalitarian to a democratic state, as a whole, the class appreciated his concept of “piecemeal change” for both its admission of the complexities of democratic practice and its reasonableness. To the practice of the humanities as part of the democratic project, the class added Popper's call for self-reflection and perspective on the self and responsibility for the actions of the state to Martha Nussbaum's call for a cultivation of empathy and the ability to put oneself in another's shoes. With respect, though, to Nussbaum's idealism regarding the results of the Socratic method in particular, the class preferred Popper's expressions of the complexities of democracy and attaining democracy through piecemeal experimentation. The point was made that unlike Plato's Republic in which the Philosopher King is an identifiable holder of power, in a democracy, a range of interests may hold power, thus, making a clear target for dissent or dissatisfaction difficult. Further, specifically regarding the development of democracy in the United States, decades-long struggles on the part of women, minorities, and workers have led to their wider inclusion as rights holders, thus, for example, to expect the countries involved in the Arab Spring to manifest democracy and enfranchisement for all immediately is more than likely unrealistic given democracy's piecemeal engineering. However, as cautioned by Popper, we are not to think that just because a pattern was established in the past this indicates the pattern will continue. Full-enfranchised democracy without lag could be produced by a state emerging from a dictatorship. In Popper's view, there are no immutable laws governing history.
Unresolved in the discussion was the role of creative types (writers, artists, etc.) and thinkers (philosophers) with respect to democratic practice. Popper highlighted Plato's aestheticism regarding the symmetry of the Republic and the social stability it brings. As a class we remained unsure of the role of the creative types in providing instruction or support for the cultivation of the self-awareness and empathy as well as the sense of social responsibility we generally agreed may be the hallmarks of the democratic citizen. Of particular note came the conclusion that potentially in the US we have drifted from the notion of civic responsibility as coupled with the social contract for self-expression and self-actualization. Though as US citizens we have a sense that anything is possible, we no longer (did we ever?) explicitly couple that altruism or regard for the rights of our compatriots.
Class concluded with a review by Dr. Collier of the models of social organization we have thus far explored in this course: the university, the Republic, the Open Society, tribalism. Later this week we begin our exploration of science and its model of small experimentation and adjustment also as a potential model.
(Crystal)
We opened our discussion of Karl Popper’s The Open Society and Its Enemies (Volume 1: Plato) by connecting Popper’s argument for the open society with Nussbaum’s advocating of critical thinking as a means of making more empathetic and involved citizens. Both perspectives on forming an effective democratic state are informed by a need for individuals to take personal responsibility for shaping their society. Nussbaum was described as starry-eye” in her insistence that critical thinking would lead to empathetic citizens of the world, whereas Popper’s approach was more pragmatic in his specific argument for social change through piecemeal engineering. The class generally agreed that piecemeal engineering – or working to fix small problems instead of trying to wipe the slate clean for some greater utopian good to replace the current state – was (to say the least) preferable.
How the open society w/could function logistically was another point of discussion. Popper describes the open society as being one of intense competition, which made us wonder if by aspiring to an open society, we may be replicating undesirable aspects of a neoliberal one. We faltered a bit when attempting to discuss how we might go about testing, managing, assessing, or maintaining a free, open society in which everyone is trusted with all knowledge and given a say. Would someone have to be in a position of more power for these activities to take place? As far as the testing goes, how do we predict results that we can test in a scientific manner? Popper doesn’t seem to have a problem with prediction, as his points of contention are with attempting to work back to a utopia considered historical or dismissing actions based on the inevitable failure that history supposedly proves. He dislikes extremes posited on a study of history, as he argues that they can’t really be made and blind us to alternatives. (But he seems okay with predicting things that we can test scientifically, and we should not attempt anything that would be too harmful if it backfired.) Going back: what happens in this open society of critical thinkers if there are certain ones who manage to take (or wind up in) control (socially/ politically/economically)? Ideally, there are enough critical thinkers to stop that from happening.
The discussion then centered around models of social organization (e.g. the university, the republic, science, the open society, tribalism (the closed society). When background social conditions get posited, the question becomes how we react in relation to these social structures, and Popper does not think it should be about starting anew, but about choosing what aspects to keep and to toss. This is how Popper’s piecemeal social engineering of an open society should work, but infused with a scientific approach to conducting small-scale social experiments. (A great deal more came up, but this must suffice for now.)
(Alex McCarthy)
Taking as our opening theme the similarities and dissimilarities between Popper and the authors we've read previously, we expressed a greater satisfaction with Popper's proposals than with, say, Nussbaum's, whose calls for democracy, empathy, and critical thinking continue to strike us as somewhat vague or even naïve. While Not for Profit and The Open Society and Its Enemies share a general, if not a specific, commitment to democracy and critical thinking, and while they align nicely where education is concerned, Popper provides us the vocabulary to critique Nussbaum when he denounces sweeping Utopian social engineering that seeks to implement a definitively conceptualized ideal. Nussbaum's visions of Tagore or Dewey are quite far from current practice and we don't see her offering practicable paths in that direction. Alternatively, Popper endorses piecemeal engineering, which we seem to find more appealing for its sensible admission that all may not go well. We had previously wondered if Nussbaum was proposing methods while presupposing outcomes. Popper does no such thing.
Nevertheless, we have expressed doubts about the value of a piecemeal model in the deposing of a totalitarian regime. We mentioned the possibility of retaining certain personnel from such a regime to facilitate a workable transition on the piecemeal model. In fact, change may even be more likely when state power can be located, as it can be in a dictatorship and cannot be in a democracy. The difficulty of locating power centers in the US leads us to doubt the efficacy of individual political acts. However, Popper proffers a starting point for checking such pessimism by advising against taking as inherent to a structure that which has historically transpired within it.
On the subject of structures, we continued our examination of models for structuring society. We will soon read of Popper's science model. In our discussion of volume one, we reviewed the models we've encountered thus far, including the university, the open society (which may make much use of science), and the closed society of tribalism. Going forward, we will continue to formulate definitions of knowledge and processes for inquiry.
(Uren)
My impression was that most of the class agreed with Popper's critiques, but the cogs did not turn so smoothly as we investigated Popper's methods of social engineering: how do we enact piecemeal engineering, interventionism, or institutional analysis? Is the state a laboratory and is it possible (or should we) bridge the gap between theory and the world? It is easy to identify the underlying problems with Popper's suggestions for improving society: trial and error will inevitably result in catastrophes that might have been avoided; social experiments require a certain context and may function well on a micro scale, but result in longterm problems or have unforeseeable effects when instituted on a broad societal level; we must determine the limits of an abstraction: interventionism; and the success of Popper's models of social improvement relies on rationality and personal responsibility. Aside from these impediments, Popper's methods of improving society must struggle up the banks of a cynical age or be swept away by the waves.
Rather than let the matter rest and leave myself with a handful of problems, I think that, in Popper's spirit, it would be best to posit some solutions. Therefore, I would argue that error might be avoided through probability and thorough empiricism (although, one faces the difficulty of deciding what counts as an error, which leads to essentialism and infinite regression—I am still stuck on how to proceed without definitions and conceptions. But perhaps a hypothesis of democracy is necessary—a manifesto seems appropriate in this respect, but who gets to write that manifesto?) Also, social experiments should be gradually grown in scale: when we conduct piecemeal engineering, we should slowly increase the amount of society affected by an experiment and tweak this experiment as we proceed. Determining the limits of interventionism will rely on an ability to retract power quickly and to set limits on the size of institutions and make it clear that every institution is transitory. The reason for this is that the danger of interventionism is “that it leads to an increase in state power and in bureaucracy” (193). As for people's rationality and responsibility, I think this is promoted by a government in which people are directly involved in the decisions made by their government and capable of seeing the effects of policy.
On a side note, I think that the theory of the trade cycle as interpreted by Alex and Robert are worth looking at before the class undertakes the collective construction of our manifesto. (Dave)
Late though this may be, it has given me a little extra time to reflect on the discussion as a whole. While there seemed to be general agreement of Popper's critiques, there also seemed to be a general unsatisfaction with his solutions and methods. Listening to and watching it all play out was dizzying, but I feel productive as we searched for ways of putting the puzzle back together without missing pieces or uncertain fits. I agree with Dave's comment that Popper's suggestions must battle against the general cynicism of the age, which makes me regret we did not get a chance to address that more during our discussion. In particular, Popper's likening of class consciousness "being conscious of the fact that they belong to a beaten army… it is possible that the solidarity… may be undermined by defeatism" (148). The cynicism and apathy we face poses a huge problem to any solution we pose, even if we have managed to work out all the other details. What if no one cares?
That being said, I'm not entirely sure what the solution to that would be, other than to find some way to get people motivated to give a damn about the system they're living in again. A vague answer at best. Crystal's separation of cynicism in the academy and in society on the question forum I feel is somewhat tentative, only in that I think these two types or places of cynicism feed off of each other. Where one exists, the other is sure to follow.
(Kate)
